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ON MOTION PICTURE CREATORS*
par Jonathan HERMAN**
Les droits traditionnels qui accordent à l'artiste le monopole sur
l'exploitation financière de son oeuvre, sont maintenant complétés par
l'expansion des droits moraux qui ont été introduits au Canada par la
réforme de la Loi sur les droits d'auteur de 1988. Le concept des droits
moraux est inspiré de la doctrine européenne selon laquelle l'art est une
extension de la personnalité de son auteur. Ce concept inclut donc le
droit à la divulgation, le droit à la paternité et le droit à l'intégrité de
l'oeuvre artistique.
Ces nouveaux «droits de la personnalité» semblent applicables
également à tous les artistes. Cependant, en pratique la disposition de
la Loi qui permet la renonciation des droits moraux pourrait consé-
quemment diminuer la protection des employés-créateurs. L'auteur
soumet que cette crainte est particulièrement présente dans les milieux
artistiques de collaboration tel que la production cinématographique et
ceci en raison de l'inégalité du pouvoir de négociation entre créateurs
et producteurs.
                        
The traditional rights of an artist to preserve his monopoly on
the financial exploitation of his work, now take their place alongside
newly expanded moral rights introduced by the reform of Canada's
Copyright Act in 1988. Moral rights are inspired by the European
doctrine that art is the extension of the creator's personality and they
include the rights to divulge, to claim authorship and to maintain the
integrity of artistic work.
These new «rights of personality» appear to apply equally to all
artists. In practice, however, the Act's provision for waiving moral
rights could lead to diminished protection for employee-creators. The
author suggests that this is particularly true in the collaborative arts
such as motion picture production where unequal bargaining condi-
tions between creators and producers are likely to prevail.
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1. CANADA, A Charter of Rights for Creators: Report of the Sub-Committee on
the Revision of Copyright, Ottawa, Minister of Supply and Services, 1985, p. 6.
2. A.A. KEYES and C. BRUNET, Copyright in Canada - Proposals for Revision of
the Law, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1977, pp. 55-59. In fact, it was this report
whose thrust in favour of creators' moral rights marked a significant departure
from previous studies which suggested that such rights should be based more on
contractual rather than statutory considerations. p. 55.
3. CANADA, From Gutenberg to Telidon: A White Paper on Copyright, Ottawa,
Minister of Supply and Services, 1984, pp. 1, 25-27.
4. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 14(4), formerly R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, s.
12(7).
5. An Act to amend the Copyright Act and to amend other Acts in Consequence
thereof, R.S.C. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.), formerly S.C. 1988, c. 15.
INTRODUCTION
There is more at stake in the expression
of a work than economic reward. Crea-
tive works are very much the expres-
sion of the personality of their authors.
There is an identification between au-
thors and their works. The Sub-Com-
mittee agrees with the many witnesses
who stated that creators cannot be fully
protected unless their moral rights are
recognized and enhanced.
- A Charter of Rights for Creators1
For creators who believe that society's need to exploit artistic
endeavour must be tempered with the recognition that art is an exten-
sion of the very personality of the artist, this affirmation in 1985 by the
House of Commons Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright is a
welcomed statement of principle. Statements of this kind are not new
in Canada. In 1977, Keyes and Brunet made similar declarations in
support of the codification of moral rights for creators2, as did the
government's White Paper in 19843. Nor was statutory inclusion of
moral rights completely foreign to Canadian law before 1985. The
right of an author, independently of his copyright, to claim authorship
of his work as well as to restrain its distortion has been part of the
Copyright Act since 19314. After more than thirty years of discussion
of how to adapt antiquated copyright legislation to a rapidly changing
society, the Charter of Rights for Creators is particularly significant in
that it became the direct precursor to long-awaited legislative change.
During the summer of 1988, Parliament finally adopted its Act to
Amend the Copyright Act5, and with it, a new set of moral rights for
creators.
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6. Arthur L. STEVENSON Jr., «Moral Right and the Common Law: A Proposal»,
in American Society of Composers Authors and Publishers: Copyright Sympo-
sium, No. 6, New York, Columbia University Press, 1955, pp. 92-107. In the
United States, for example, the moral right to claim authorship of a work has
been indirectly sanctioned by citing a film distributor for breach of contract for
not acknowledging the producer of the film on promotional posters (pp. 98-99).
The author also gives the example of an action for damages in tort for the modi-
fication of sculptures without the artist's permission (pp. 104-105). Whether the
possibility for such recourse exists in Canada is doubtful, considering the general
limitation on copyright actions as provided by s. 63 of the Copyright Act.
Although the reform deserves a warm round of applause, its
proponents would do well to withhold any enthusiastic standing ova-
tions for now, especially if they consider themselves to be moral rights
«purists» or if they believe that all creators, particularly those
employed in the motion picture industry, will benefit equally under the
new law.
A general skepticism is warranted if one recognizes the
apparent juxtaposition of this country's two legal traditions. Canada's
copyright law is inspired, first and foremost, by the Anglo-American
emphasis on the artist's economic right to profit from society's
commercial exploitation of his creativity. The notion that the product
of creative activity is a fundamental expression of one's personality and
apart from whatever pecuniary benefits that may accrue to an artist, is
absent from this legal tradition except to the extent that such rights of
personality may find application in common law actions for injunction,
defamation, negligence or breach of contract6. At the same time, the
1988 reform of the Copyright Act, in its repeal and replacement of s.
14(4), incorporates principles derived from the European tenets of the
moral rights doctrine which explicitly codifies the concept of the extra-
patrimonial nature of artistic expression. It is by examining the extent
to which Canadian law embraces the European doctrine, that moral
rights purists can assess the general impact of reform on creators'
rights. This evaluation of the incorporation of moral rights doctrine in
Canada will be the subject of the first part of my study in which I
provide, in one section, an overview of the doctrine's basic concepts,
drawing primarily on French law for illustration. In a later section, I
assess the degree to which these concepts have been, and are now, part
of Canadian copyright law.
The second part of my analysis will address the question of
whether all creators will benefit equally under the moral rights
provisions of the revised Copyright Act by focusing on creators in the
motion picture industry. While the Act does not directly discriminate
against any particular artists, the very nature of film production greatly
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complicates the applicability of the moral rights contained therein. In
order to illustrate the problems in the Copyright Act which affect
motion picture creators, I will discuss the two conditions necessary for
the exercise of moral rights: 1) that there must be a copyrightable
«work» and 2) that the creator must be an «author» of the work. The
notion of collaborative works and the role of employment contracts in
the film industry will be central to the discussion. In this part I will
refer to both the English and the French copyright laws for their
solutions to some of the problems engendered by the nature of motion
picture production.
Part I The Framework for Moral Rights in Canada
To what extent does the 1988 revision of the Copyright Act
embrace the European theoretical model of moral rights? The first
section will provide an overview of the moral rights doctrine by
examining both the nature and the different categories of these rights.
The introduction of moral rights in Canadian law with s. 14(4) of the
Copyright Act as well as the recent modifications, will be examined in
the second section.
1. Overview of the Moral Rights Doctrine
The relationship between the artist and society may be
characterized in straightforward economic terms: society places
demands on its members to share with it the fruits of their intellectual
labour. Artists supply those demands; however, if society recognizes an
artist's right of ownership of his intellectual work, he may set
conditions and exact a price for the society's consumption of it.
Copyright confers in the creator a monopoly to exploit his work in
public for his own economic self-interest. Moral rights doctrine, on the
other hand, begins with the premise that intellectual creation is a
reflection of the originality of the spirit and personality of the author.
Quite apart from the economic right to exploit one's work, the person
and his creation are disassociable.
In his study of the evolution of the doctrine, Stig Stromholm
situates the origins of the modern juridical notion of moral rights in
nineteenth century France and Germany with the philosophical
development of rights attaching to the person and after «la création
d'un minimum de protection pour les intérêts patrimoniaux des
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7. Stig STROMHOLM, Le droit moral de l'auteur en droit allemand, français et
scandinave avec un aperçu de l'évolution internationale: étude de droit comparé,
Stockholm, P.A. Norstedt & Soners Forlag, 1967, pp. 256-259.
8. Jeffrey MEADE, «Moral Rights in Intellectual Property and the "Film
Colourization" Debate: An Applied Study», (1988) 4 I.P.J.  63 at p. 68.
9. STROMHOLM, op. cit, note 7 at p. 240.
10. Id., pp. 244-245.
auteurs»7. The development of the notion of moral rights, however, is
not only the product of pure theory, but it is as well a reflection of
sociological change, as Jeffrey Meade points out in his brief summary
on the rise of moral rights in Europe:
The recognition of an artist's moral
rights may be seen then, as the product
of the evolving relationship between
the artist and his patron; that is from
that of a craftsman who brought into
being embodiments of the ideals and
vision of his patron (more often than
not the Church) to that of an individual
who viewed his work as a form of self-
expression. Concomitant to this was
the changing relationship between the
artist and his creation...8
It is the nature of this relationship to which I now turn.
1.1 Nature of Moral Rights
The fundamental characteristic of moral rights is that they are
attached to the personality of the author. Stromholm underlines the
central importance of this point:
En effet, le droit moral moderne
pourrait être décrit comme le résultat
d'une opération intellectuelle qui
consiste simplement en l'adoption, à un
moment donné, de la catégorie
juridique des droits de la personnalité
pour désigner l'ensemble des règles
censées protéger les intérêts non
patrimoniaux des auteurs9.
Kant believed that these extrapatrimonial «droits de la personnalité»
would best be within the ambit of positive rather than natural law10. Of
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11. Loi du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire artistique, no. 57-298 as amended
by no. 85-660.
12. Claude COLOMBET, Propriété littéraire et artistique, Paris, Dalloz, 2ième éd.,
1980, p. 136.
13. Infra, pp. 13-14.
14. C. COLOMBET, op. cit., note 12 at p. 138.
course, the multiplicity of moral rights legislation in the world bears
him out, but more importantly, even the very nature of these rights are
found in today's positive law. The French Loi du 11 mars 1957 sur la
propriété littéraire artistique offers a clear example:
Art. 6. L'auteur jouit du droit au respect
de son nom, de sa qualité et de son
oeuvre. Ce droit est attaché à sa
personne. Il est perpétuel, inaliénable
et imprescriptible...11
The fact that moral rights are perpetual, inalienable and inde-
feasible follows logically from the concept that they are attached to the
person. In the words of Claude Colombet, «le droit moral s'attache à
l'auteur comme la lueur au phosphore»12. It is here that the nature of
moral rights in the European tradition is distinguishable from econo-
mic rights. The latter are limited to a specific term, usually the life of
the author plus fifty years from his death,  whereas the former are
unlimited in that they may be perpetually transmitted by succession.
Moral rights are inalienable (and therefore unseizable) and cannot be
waived13while economic rights can be assigned. Lastly, moral rights
are indefeasible in that they may be exercized by an author even after
assigning his pecuniary rights «aussi longtemps que l'oeuvre survit
dans la mémoire des hommes et fait l'objet d'une exploitation»14.
Having identified their principal characteristics according to
the European model, it remains to examine the different categories of
moral rights.
1.2 Categories of Moral Rights
There are essentially three broad classifications of moral rights
which an author may exercize. First, he has the right to divulge his
work. Second, he has the right to claim paternity of the work and third,
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15. The right to withdraw a work from the public is usually considered as a separate
category; however, I have decided to group it with the right to divulge works,
since the principles underlying these concepts are virtually identical.
16. C. COLOMBET, op. cit., note 12 at p. 140.
17. Loi du 11 mars 1957 sur la propriété littéraire artistique, no. 57-298 as amended
by no. 85-660. Article 32 reads as follows: Nonobstant la cession de son droit
d'exploitation, l'auteur, même postérieurement à la publication de son oeuvre,
jouit d'un droit de repentir ou de retrait vis-à-vis du cessionnaire. Il ne peut
toutefois exercer ce droit qu'à charge d'indemniser préalablement le cessionnaire
du préjudice que ce repentir ou ce retrait peut lui causer. Lorsque,
the right to its respect and integrity15. I will deal with each of these in
turn.
The right of an artist to divulge the product of his creativity is
simply the ability to render his work available to the public or to keep
it secret. Although this ability is consistent with the fundamental
concept of rights attaching to the person, it is not difficult to confuse it
with the basic economic right to publish. Given that the author has a
monopoly of exploitation of his work which is the foundation of all
copyright law, perhaps it can be said that the moral right to divulge
exists even though the term «moral right» is nowhere to be found in the
legislation. There is, however, an important distinction to be made in
that the patrimonial right to publish cannot exist without the moral
right of the author to render his work public. Colombet has this to say:
Le droit de divulgation conditionne,
dans son exercice, la naissance du droit
patrimonial; car c'est seulement en
prenant la décision de livrer l'oeuvre au
public que son auteur l'investit de
droits patrimoniaux; avant la
divulgation, l'oeuvre fait partie
intégrante de sa personnalité; avec la
divulgation, elle devient un bien
patrimonial: des droits pécuniaires
naissent à partir de ce moment16.
If an artist is invested with the moral right to make his work
public, the corollary is that he also has the right to withdraw from the
public a work already divulged. While an artist may have regrets about
the publication of his work, the exercise of his right to withdraw it
would not likely be absolute in that he would normally be required by
law to indemnify the person into whose hands or under whose control
the work has passed. Article 32 of France's Loi du 11 mars 1957 sur la
propriété littéraire artistique is an example of this principle17.
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postérieurement à l'exercice du droit de repentir ou de retrait, l'auteur décide de
faire publier son oeuvre, il est tenu d'offrir par priorité ses droits d'exploitation
au cessionnaire qu'il avait originairement choisi et aux conditions originairement
déterminées.
18. S. STROMHOLM, op. cit., note 7 at p. 140.
The second category is the artist's right of paternity over the
work, or his right to claim authorship of his creation. It also includes
the right not to be associated with the work by using a pseudonym or
by remaining anonymous if the work is made public. Noteworthy is the
absence of moral rights protection in cases where a person uses an
author's name for a work that the author did not create18.
Finally, an artist has the moral right to protect the work from
unauthorized distortion, mutilation or modification. Here again, the
concept that an artist's creation is an expression of the uniqueness of
his personality is inextricably linked to the principle that damage done
to the work is actually an attack on the honour or reputation of the
artist - damage to the person himself. Considering the upcoming analy-
sis of the introduction of moral rights in Canadian law by virtue of the
Rome Copyright Convention and s. 14(4) of the Copyright Act, for
now, I will limit my comments on the right of integrity to these general
parameters.
2. Moral Rights in Canadian Law
Until 1931, Canadian copyright law was solidly and exclusive-
ly anchored to the Anglo-American tradition of protecting the author's
pecuniary interests. Moral rights doctrine, still based in Europe, had no
place in Canadian legal thought although elements of it would be intro-
duced when Canada sought to fulfill its international obligations under
the 1928 Rome Copyright Convention. In this section, I will examine s.
14(4) of the Copyright Act and then evaluate the extent to which the
European moral rights doctrine has been embraced by the reforms
adopted in 1988.
2.1 Adherence to the Rome Copyright Convention
1928
Article 6 bis of the Rome Copyright Convention 1928 proved
to be the legislative model for the introduction of the notion of moral
rights in Canada. It reads as follows:
(1) Independently of the author's copy-
right, and even after transfer of the said
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19. The Rome Copyright Convention 1928, art. 6 bis, Schedule III, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-42.
20. Ibid.
copyright, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work,
as well as the right to object to any dis-
tortion, mutilation or other modifica-
tion of the said work which would be
prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
(2) The determination of the conditions
under which these rights shall be exer-
cised is reserved  for  the  national  le-
gislation  of  the countries of the
Union. The means of redress for
safeguarding these rights shall be
regulated  by  the  legislation  of  the
country where protection is claimed19.
Only two of the three moral rights included in the European conception
of rights of the personality are contained in this article -the right to the
paternity and the integrity of the work. Moreover, there is no mention
at all of their fundamental nature. Despite reference to these rights
existing independently of the author's copyright we will see that the
section falls short of protecting authors bound by employment
contracts. Furthermore, it leaves the door open in paragraph 220, for
each nation to determine its own rules for exercizing these rights,
underscoring the obvious silence on the term during which the author
may benefit, a noticeable departure from the perpetual character
inherent in moral rights.
In 1931, Parliament incorporated the language of article 6 bis
virtually word for word as part of its willingness to conform to its
international obligations as a signatory of the Convention. With the
adoption of the language came its limited scope as well:
14(4) Independently of the author's
copyright, and even after the
assignment, either wholly or partially,
of the said copyright, the author has the
right to claim authorship of the work,
as well as the right to restrain any
distortion, mutilation or other
modification of the work that would be
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21. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 14(4).
22. David VAVER, «Snow v. The Eaton Centre: Wreaths on Sculpture Prove Acco-
lade for Artists' Moral Rights», (1983-84) 8 C.B.L.J., p. 91.
23. Snow v. The Eaton Centre, (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. H.C.).
24. Patsalas v. The National Ballet of Canada, (1986) 13 C.P.R. (3d) 522 (Ont.
H.C.).
25. Id., p. 528.
26. Pollock v. CFCN Productions Ltd., (1983) 73 C.P.R. (2d) 204 at p. 206 (Alta.
Q.B.).
prejudicial to his honour or
reputation21.
Notwithstanding the section's apparent shortcomings, it has proven that
although it «may well be a toothless tiger, its tail can still deliver a
powerful whack»22 at least insofar as it applies the right to the integrity
of the author's work, and this despite the fact that Canadian courts have
had few opportunities to test its scope.
In one of the only reported cases in this matter, Snow v. The
Eaton Centre, the artist was able to demonstrate, at least for the purpo-
ses of injunctive relief, that the defendant's decoration of his sculpture
was a prima facie distortion which prejudiced his honour or reputa-
tion23. The judgment implicitly recognizes the fundamental notion of
the work as an extension of the artist's personality.
The essential test in order to grant relief under s. 14(4) is that
the author must have suffered prejudice to his honour or reputation,
and of course this is a subjective assessment the judge must make in
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case. The court's
subjectivity was equally apparent in Patsalas v. The National Ballet of
Canada where a choreographer sought to restrain the direction by ano-
ther choreographer, of one of the works he had created24. He was un-
successful in convincing the judge of the prejudice which would be
caused to him should the ballet proceed25. A similar question was rai-
sed in the case of a screenwriter in Pollock v. CFCN Productions al-
though the court concluded that an injunction to restrain the showing
of a film was justified on the grounds that a «serious question of law»,
namely the interpretation of s. 14(4) should be considered at trial26.
While none of the cases shed light on the specific elements
necessary to show prejudice to honour or reputation of the author, they
are equally silent on the meaning of «distortion, mutilation or other
modification» which is the other prong for moral rights remedy under
s. 14(4). Although the terms suggest a catch-all for every type of
change to the work, E. Colas argues that the moral right to integrity
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27. E. COLAS, «Le droit moral de l'artiste sur son oeuvre», (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev.
521 at p. 532.
28. Copyright Act. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 13(3) reads as follows: «Where the
author was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service
or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by
that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence
of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright»...
29. Jacques BONCOMPAIN, Le droit d'auteur au Canada: Etude critique, Ottawa,
Le Cercle du Livre de France Ltée, 1971, p. 277.
30. An Act to amend the Copyright Act and to amend other Acts in Consequence
thereof, R.S.C. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.).
should include recourse for the destruction of the work, even in the
case where the artist cedes his property rights to another by way of
contract, and this despite the fact that the word «destruction» is not
expressly part of s. 14(4)27.
A final observation should be made about the person s. 14(4)
seeks to protect. One of the deficiencies of this provision is that it
seems to exclude authors who create works under employment con-
tracts. The beneficiary of 14(4) is the author «independently of [his]
copyright...». Thus, it follows that only those creators who are capable
of owning copyright are deemed to be authors for the purposes of mo-
ral rights protection. Given that s. 13(3)28 vests first ownership of a
copyrighted work in the employer where the author was employed to
create the work, it is inconceivable that the employee can claim a right
to the integrity of the work any more than he can claim a right of pater-
nity. Boncompain argues along the same lines:
Il ne semble pas que l'on puisse parler
ici de cession. L'auteur naturel de
l'oeuvre est, juridiquement, censé
n'avoir jamais été titulaire du droit
d'auteur. Il ne pourrait donc pas
prétendre au bénéfice au paragraphe 7
de l'article 1229.
This clear derogation from the moral rights doctrine appears to have
been remedied with the 1988 reform of the Copyright Act, as we shall
see in the next section.
2.2 Reform of the Copyright Act
The adoption of An Act to Amend the Copyright Act30 is
notable for, among other things, its recognition of the need to clarify
and extend the narrow and somewhat weak attempt by s. 14(4) to
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31. Id., ss. 3, 4.
32. Id., ss. 6, 11.
33. Id., s. 4.
34. Ibid.
35. Id., s. 8.
36. Infra, p. 15.
37. R.S.C. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.), s. 4.
38. From Gutenberg to Telidon, op. cit., note 3 at p. 26.
embrace the moral rights doctrine in Canada. Far from a perfect
reflection of the European model, the Act does go a long way to confer
wider rights for creators. The new s. 14.1 replaces 14(4)31 and reaffirms
the author's right of paternity and of the integrity of the work, the latter
subject to the general rules of infringement enumerated in ss. 28.1 and
28.2(1)(a) and (b), restrictions in ss. 28.2(3) and 64.1 as well as
presumptions attaching to specific works in 28.2(2)32. The principle of
the inalienability of moral rights is contained in ss. 14.1(2), (3) and
(4)33although tempered by the right to waive moral rights as stipulated
in the same sections. Despite the fact that s. 14.2 fills the gap caused by
s. 14(4)'s silence on the term of moral rights, the new provision clearly
derogates from the perpetual nature of the rights by limiting them to
the same term as economic rights34. Lastly, s. 34 now contains subs.
(1.1) which lists recourses available for authors whose moral rights
have been infringed35.
It is not my intention here to undertake an exhaustive analysis
of each of these provisions; however, a number of observations are in
order. The first deals with the beneficiaries of moral rights under the
new law, a subject I will return to when I examine the moral rights of
motion picture creators36. Section 14.1(1) is the foundation for the
rights covered by the revision and it reads as follows:
14.1(1) The author of a work has,
subject to section 28.2 the right to the
integrity of the work and, in connection
with an act mentioned in subsection 3,
the right, where reasonable in the
circumstances, to be associated with
the work as its author by name or under
a pseudonym and the right to remain
anonymous37.
The words «independently of the author's copyright» which we saw in
the now repealed s. 14(4), are conspicuously absent, this despite the
recommendation in From Gutenberg to Telidon to retain the wording38.
In my view, this amendment effectively removes the barrier previously
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39. R.S.C. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.), s. 6.
40. E. COLAS, loc. cit., note 27.
41. A Charter of Rights for Creators, op. cit, note 1 at p. 7.
faced by employees who could not benefit from moral rights since they
could not have been endowed, as legal authors, with the right of
ownership of copyright in a work. All that is now necessary is for a
person to create a copyrightable work in order for him to be an author
envisioned by s. 14.1(1). This reasoning takes on its full importance,
when read with 14.1(2), the allowance for waivers, with respect to
creators in the motion picture industry, for example, as well as in those
sectors where creation under employment contracts is integral to the
business.
Where the reform innovates is in s. 28.2 which provides the
conditions upon which an author may institute proceedings for the
infringement of his moral right of integrity:
28.2(1) The author's right to the
integrity of a work is infringed only if
the work is, to the prejudice of the
honour or reputation of the author,
(a) distorted, mutilated or otherwise
modified: or (b) used in association
with a product, service, cause or
institution.
(2) In the case of a painting, sculpture
or engraving, the prejudice referred to
in subsection (1) shall be deemed to
have occurred as a result of any
distortion, mutilation or other
modification of the work39.
Although it is evident that Parliament did not take into account Colas'
call for the explicit inclusion of the right of recourse against the
destruction of a work40, it did adopt the 1985 Sub-Committee
recommendation that authors be protected from unauthorized use of
their work in advertising given «the realities of our consumer
society»41. The presumption of infringement of the right of integrity in
the case of unique works should also be a welcomed addition to the
rights of artists.
To conclude this part of my study, I would suggest that the
1988 revision of the Copyright Act is a marked improvement over the
half-hearted introduction of moral rights in s. 14(4) although it remains
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a considerable distance in some respects from the purists' conception
of moral rights theory. Notable gaps include the waiveability of the
rights and the term linked to that of economic rights. As for the
absence of the explicit moral right in Canada to render a work public, I
see no practical difference between that and the economic right to
publish. Perhaps it is at the level of principle versus practicality that
the European and Anglo-American traditions differ so markedly.
Certainly, the juxtaposition of the two approaches in one law will pose
the most interesting challenges of interpretation for intellectual
property jurists.
I turn now to the narrower question of the applicability of the
reform to creators in the motion picture industry.
Part II Application of Reform on Motion Picture Creators
The 1985 Sub-Committee's A Charter of Rights for Creators42
makes no declaration that all creators are created equal. The rights
contained in the Copyright Act are destined, it is true, to provide for
the general well-being of those among us whose talent is expressed in
books, paintings, photographs, and so on. But the law which confers
upon these people the economic and newly expanded moral rights
protection to encourage them to exploit their activity, does not apply to
everybody who puts pen to paper or light to celluloid. Our copyright
legislation only protects creators who express themselves in a work
specifically recognized by Parliament, and such creators must be
«authors» of the work according to law. Thus, in order to answer the
question «are creators better off after the expansion of moral rights in
Canada?», we must first determine if they have created a copyrightable
«work», and if they are «authors».
Situating the motion picture industry in the larger evaluation of
moral rights reform is particularly interesting, not only because of the
distinct treatment it receives in the law as a result of its special
technological nature and connection with diverse types of expression,
but also because of the interplay, generally speaking, between two of
its central features: each production is the result of a multiplicity of
creative input and the industry is big, capital-intensive business. The
extent to which moral rights provisions will benefit creators in this
business depends on 1) whether there can be a multiplicity of authors
and 2) the strength of their bargaining power if they are employees in
the business.
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In the analysis which follows, I will first explore the nature of
film productions as copyrightable «works». A second section will deal
with the identification of «authors» as well as the consequences of
employment relationships on moral rights protection.
1. Condition: Motion Picture Work Must be
Copyrightable
We have already seen that in order for a creator to benefit from
moral rights protection as defined in s. 14.1(1) of the Copyright Act43,
he must be an author of a work44. In this part I discuss the general
qualifications necessary for motion pictures or their constituent
elements to be copyrightable works and I provide an overview of the
idea that films are «collaborative works».
1.1 Notion of Motion Picture «Works»
Section 5(1) of the Copyright Act states that «... copyright shall
subsist in Canada... in every literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
work...»45. Films that we see in movie theatres are likely to involve a
number of these distinct works. The novel upon which a film is based,
for example, would be copyrighted as a literary work; the musical
score would be protected as a musical work and the choreography of a
dance number would be protected as a dramatic work46. But a film is
more than disparate creative elements, rather, they also exist as whole
entities, independent subjects capable of being protected by copyright
law.
A motion picture may be protected as a dramatic or artistic
work. The definition of «dramatic work» in s. 2 «includes... any
cinematograph production where the arrangement or acting form or the
combination of incidents represented give the work an original
character»47. If the film does not contain incidents that give the work
an original character, «the cinematograph production shall be protected
as a photograph»48, and therefore, as an artistic work whose definition
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includes photographs49. Canadian Admiral Corporation v. Rediffusion
Inc. is the main authority on the evaluation of what gives a film an
original character and thus, the distinction between films as dramatic
or artistic works50.
The categorization of films as one or another subject of
copyright determines the type of economic rights the copyright owner
may exercize according to s. 3 of the Act; however, there is another
qualification which can be made for the purpose of ascribing
authorship in copyrightable works in situations where contributions to
the creation of a work have been made by more than one person. Given
that motion picture productions usually involve the creative input of
many people, it is revelant, for the determination of who may benefit
from moral rights protection, to know if Canadian copyright law
regards films as «collaborative works».
1.2 Motion Pictures as «Collaborative Works»
Jacques Boncompain points to two completely different
meanings for collaborative works:
La collaboration peut être entendue de
deux manières. Dans la première,
plusieurs personnes contribuent à la
réalisation d'une même oeuvre,
chacune d'entre elles agissant dans le
domaine qui relève de sa compétence.
A i n s i ,  d a n s  u n e  o e u v r e
mélodramatique, l'une composera la
musique, l'autre le livret. Dans la
seconde, il n'y aura collaboration que si
l'ensemble des personnes qui ont pris
part à sa réalisation, ont agi de concert
dans la composition de chacun de ses
éléments51.
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The contrast between the two concepts is striking and the application
of one or the other has far-reaching ramifications. Those ramifications
for motion picture creators will be the subject of an upcoming section;
for now it is useful to look at which interpretation has been favoured in
comparative law. I begin with France.
In order for a work to be classified as collaborative in France,
only one condition is necessary as Henri Desbois points out:
... il suffit que des efforts distincts aient
été appliqués à un but commun et que
chacune des contributions ait été
réalisée en contemplation des autres.
C'est donc à la communauté
d'inspiration et au mutuel contrôle
qu'est attaché le critère de la
coopération52.
In other words, collaboration is not restricted by a narrow requirement
for absolute indivisibility of the artists' contribution to the point where
one cannot distinguish one's efforts from another. The French
copyright law is squarely in line with the tendency which allows for the
divisibility of contributions but indivisibility of authorship:
Art. 9. Est dite oeuvre de collaboration,
l'oeuvre à la création de laquelle ont
concouru plusieurs personnes
physiques.
Art. 10. L'oeuvre de collaboration est la
propriété commune des coauteurs53.
The law goes as far as to recognize cinematographic works (now
included in the broader category of audio-visual works)54 as
collaborative efforts:
Art. 14. Ont la qualité d'auteur d'oeuvre
audiovisuelle la ou les personnes
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physiques qui réalisent la création
intellectuelle de cette oeuvre.
Sont présumés, sauf preuve contraire,
coauteurs d'une oeuvre audiovisuelle
réalisée en collaboration;
1o L'auteur du scénario;
2o L'auteur de l'adaptation;
3o L'auteur du texte parlé;
4o L'auteur des compositions musicales
avec ou sans paroles spécialement
réalisées pour l'oeuvre;
5o Le réalisateur55.
As we can see, the classification of motion pictures as collaborative
works, has an enormous impact on the ownership of moral rights in
France. Any creator on a production, therefore, can benefit from the
protection conferred by the copyright law, even those who are not
specifically presumed to be creators by virtue of art. 14.
The English Copyright Act 1956, on the other hand, endorses
the narrower approach and unlike the French law, makes no special
accomodation for motion pictures within the ambit of collaborative
works. Section 11(3) defines a work of joint authorship as «a work
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the
contribution of each author is not separate from the contribution of the
other author or authors»56. Canada's Copyright Act uses wording which
is virtually identical57. Although Harold Fox's reliance on Levy v.
Rutley would seem to leave open to interpretation the question of
whether films could be works of joint authorship («the contribution
need not be equal and different portions may be the sole productions of
either one»)58, I cannot see how the wording in the English and
Canadian copyright laws can be taken in any way other than in the
restrictive sense. I agree with Boncompain on this point:
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... semblerait devoir décider que
l'oeuvre cinématographique n'est pas
une oeuvre de collaboration. Même si
le producteur intervient dans le choix
des créateurs et la composition du
scénario, il est généralement possible
de distinguer la part qui revient à
chaque auteur59.
The qualification of cinematographic productions cannot, however, be
dismissed as works of joint authorship at this point since the matter is
not yet settled in law.  As the next section will demonstrate, the choice
of solution to this problem could have an important impact on the
prospects of creators in the motion picture industry who hope to benefit
from the new moral rights provisions.
2. Condition: Motion Picture Creator must be an
«Author»
Unless the creator is an author within the meaning of the
Copyright Act, he cannot hope to take advantage of the moral rights
contained therein. This section will take a closer look at the
consequences of whether or not we can apply the notion of
collaborative works to film production, and in a second part, will
examine the impact of contractual relationships between creators and
producers on claims of authorship.
2.l Consequences of Qualification of
«Collaborative Works» in Canada
We have already seen that French law singles out film
productions and other audio-visual works as being appropriately
classified as works of joint authorship in the wide sense of the term.
One way to highlight what would be the consequences for the non-
recognition of films in Canada as works of the same kind, is to look at
how comparable systems actually work in practice.
In England, the consequences are relatively straightforward.
Under the Copyright Act 1956, copyright in a film vests in only one
person: the «maker» of the film who is defined as «the person by
whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the film are
undertaken»60. The deliberate denial of the notion of collaborative
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works for film production combined with the conferral of copyright
ownership in the producer, is in marked contrast with the solution in
France whose application underscores the fundamental competition
between public policy objectives.
The Loi du 11 mars 1957 contains a comprehensive set of rules
for film production which, when viewed as a whole, points to a
dilemma involving the balance between the personal moral rights of an
author as an individual creator according to the entrenched European
moral rights doctrine, and the collective rights of coauthors to see the
fruits of their common creative goals become reality. In other words,
the particularity of collaborative works demands that the rights of the
personality of each individual contributor be mitigated in favour of the
group effort to see its work through to completion without the
overhanging threat of disruption for the sake of individual rights. This
limitation of moral rights is precisely the purpose of arts. 15 and 16 of
the law which prevents one of the authors enumerated in art. 14. (or
art. 17, if the producer has creative input) from obstructing the
completion of a film to its «standard copy», by reason of his desire to
exercize a moral right contained in art. 661. Even once a film is
completed, a coauthor intent on exercizing his recourse must be sure to
have just cause, since his obstruction could lead to an action in
damages against him62.
Just before the adoption of the new law, French courts ruled
that while two artists working on an animated cartoon were indeed
coauthors of a collaborative work, they could not abuse their moral
rights without good and sufficient reason in order to halt production on
the film. The Cour d'Appel de Paris said the following in 1953:
Considérant [qu'à] la différence du
peintre, du sculpteur, de l'écrivain, les
auteurs d'un film de dessins animés
rencontrent devant eux des droits de
collaborateurs sans doute plus
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modestes qu'on ne saurait cependant
méconnaître.
Considérant que le droit moral des
auteurs d'un film, incontestable,
indéniable et auquel un grand respect
est dû, trouve cependant sa limitation
dans le droit de ceux qui ont formé
équipe avec eux et sans lesquels leur
oeuvre serait vaine63.
Thus, French legislators in 1957 recognized that it was possible to
reconcile the fact that film creators, although entitled to rights of
coauthorship in collaborative works, could not abuse the moral rights
with which they are also endowed. Danièle Huet-Weiller pinpoints the
reasons why film producers are wary, not so much of moral rights in
and of themselves, but rather of seeing them combined with the notion
of collaborative works in the industry:
The risk of abuse increases with the
number of participants and it would
seem even more serious since a work
for the cinema ... is at the same time a
commercial and industrial enterprise
with considerable sums at stake. This
explains why distrust of the moral right
i s  m a n i f e s t  a b o v e  a l l  i n
cinematographic circles64.
She outlines the alternatives proposed by the producers in the industry:
The cinematographic work should be
considered as a commissioned or
collective work and authorship
attributed to the person physically or
morally responsible for taking the
initiative. Such arguments have won
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over the legislators in certain countries
(In Great Britain in particular...)65.
From this perspective, then, we can begin to see the consequences of
the inapplicability of the notion of collaborative work for film
productions. If the Canadian inspiration for copyright law is anchored
in principles based first and foremost on the economic exploitation of
artistic endeavour, such principles originating primarily in England, the
motion picture creator who seeks the title of «author» must either be an
independent producer or he must rely on his bargaining power in the
job market for any hope of exercising moral rights.
On the other hand, in the event that films may be classified as
collaborative works as they are in France, then the prospects of a
creator benefitting from moral rights in the Copyright Act are much
improved. Subject only to contracts of employment, which will be the
subject of the next and final part of my study, these creators need only
establish that they participated in the creative process even if their
contribution is distinct from that of the other artists involved in the
production. Such creators would then be considered «authors» within
the meaning of the Act.
2.2 Role of Employment Contracts
We have seen that in England, at least, the ownership of
copyright in a film is vested in the producer alone. The Canadian
Copyright Act is silent on the matter; however, Fox asserts that the
same is true for films in Canada: films protected as photographs or as
dramatic works have copyright vested in the producer66. In the normal
course of affairs, the production company is the employer of creators in
the film industry such as writers, directors and so on; thus, it is upon
the employer-employee relationship that moral rights protection will
largely depend, regardless of the solution to the problem of
qualification of films as collaborative works.
It is here that the juxtaposition of the European moral rights
doctrine with the Anglo-American tradition finds its full significance.
In an earlier discussion I referred to what I believe is one of the most
positive of the revisions to the Copyright Act - the removal of the
qualification that authors have moral rights «independently of [their]
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copyright»67. In light of this change I reasoned that creators who
produced works while employed could now retain the moral rights
which, under s. 14(4), had not been available to them as long as the
employer was deemed to be the first owner of copyright68. If I am
correct, then employees for whom creative activity is part of the job do
not now have to clamour about the distinction between contracts of
service and contracts for services insofar as their moral rights may be
threatened69.
If authorship for the purpose of moral rights protection can still
be retained despite employment contracts, then motion picture creators
actually have nothing to fear. Or do they? After all, there seems to be
no need to have film productions classified as works of joint
authorship. Yet it is for the same reason that Canada's Copyright Act, if
it indeed follows the example of the English legislation, seems not to
recognize films as works of joint authorship, that the moral rights
doctrine will likely not have the same import as it does in Europe. This
quotation from A Charter of Rights for Creators is revealing:
Freedom is vital to the creative
environment. Concerns expressed that
hard-pressed and non-established
creators may be tempted to give away
too much control over their works are
well meant, but lead to undesirable
constraints70.
The Sub-Committee does not specify what these «undesirable
constraints» are; however, this sentiment is the backbone of the
justification that moral rights enumerated in the reformed Act can be
waived. The marked difference between Canadian and European
brands of moral rights is typified by a 1970 French case, Luntz v.
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Productions Fox Europa where the court ruled that a film director's
waiver of his moral rights in an employment contract was illegal and
against public order71. Had the Canadian case of Fuller v. SC
Entertainment been heard in France, a similar clause would likely have
been struck down by the reasoning72. It is evident that in Canada, at
least, the fundamental rights of the person as defined by European
moral rights doctrine, will be a matter of negotiation between buyers
and sellers of creative work. The pressure on creators to bargain away
rights in the collaborative arts, such as the motion picture industry, will
be that much greater.
CONCLUSION
The practical effects of the 1988 reform of Canada's Copyright
Act may not be felt for some time; however, the clarification and
extension of the existing moral rights contained in s. 14(4) should be
welcomed by most members of the nation's creative industries. True,
Canada is far off from embracing the European moral rights doctrine in
its integrity and by saying as much I do not suggest that that is
necessarily the desirable route to take. Ultimately, the direction is a
matter of public policy choices, and after more than thirty years, our
legislators have finally made theirs. With the few recent exceptions,
much of our Copyright Act is still a verbatim reproduction of that
which exists in England and it would not be surprising if the thrust of
that law continues to be influential in Canada.
Although most proponents of moral rights in Canada can
conclude that creators are better off under the new law, considering the
broader range of recourses and cause for recourse now available to
them, quite apart from the usual economic sanctions, employee-
creators may not be so fortunate in practice. For these individuals,
particularly the ones who work in the motion picture industry, the
Charter of Rights for Creators held a lot of promise but may have
fallen short on delivering the equal treatment for which most Charters
of Rights are revered.
